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9. Current account sustainability: 
the case of Turkey 
Siibidey Togan and Hasan Ersel* 
During the last three decades Turkey has experienced three balance of pay-
ments crises. The first crisis occurred in late 1970s, the second in 1994 and 
the third in 2001. These crises highlighted the danger of having too large 
current account deficits when coupled with other weaknesses in the 
economy. The crises occurred when Turkey was facing large fiscal deficits 
and high inflation rates, and when the current account deficits during the 
periods prior to the crises were largely financed by short-term foreign 
borrowing. During the 1990s the unhealthy structure of the financial sector 
contributed to the worsening economic situation. 1 Currency and maturity 
mismatches on the balance sheets of the banks had left the public author-
ities little leeway for using either interest rate or exchange rate adjustments 
to restore the external balance without undermining the stability of the 
banking sector. Furthermore Turkey lacked competent supervisory author-
ities and a regulatory framework in the banking sector. Finally, prior to the 
2001 crisis Turkey had accumulated huge debts. Thus Turkey before the 
2001 crisis had neither resolved its fiscal problems, nor attained price stabil-
ity, and it did not have a sound banking sector. There were also major prob-
lems with governance in general. 
The past few years have witnessed three major attempts at addressing 
underlying weaknesses. The first was during 2000 under the three-year 
stand-by agreement with the IMF initiated in December 1999, following a 
significant drop in output as a result of mostly external factors, including 
the earthquake. Despite some notable achievements, a worsening current 
account and a fragile banking system led in late 2000 to a liquidity crisis 
which turned into full-blown banking crisis in February 2001. The govern-
ment decided to abandon the crawling peg regime and floated the currency. 
In May 2001 the IMF increased its assistance under a new stand-by 
arrangement. Just as the revised programme was beginning to show results, 
the events of September 11 triggered the re-emergence of serious financing 
problems. In February 2002 the IMF approved a new three-year stand-by 
credit for Turkey to support the government's economic programme. In 
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August 2004 Turkey approached the IMF in hopes of achieving a final 
three-year stand-by agreement as an exit programme from instability and 
excessive debt. The new stand-by agreement was approved in May 2005. 
Actions to stabilize the economy through IMF stabilization programmes 
proved successful at combating inflation, measured by the annual average 
percentage change in the CPI, which fell from 54.9 per cent during 2000 to 
10.6 per cent in 2004 as a result of maintaining fiscal and monetary disci-
pline. The fiscal deficit decreased from 20.9 per cent in 2001 to 9.8 per cent 
of GNP in 2003, and further to 6.2 per cent in 2004. The primary balance 
amounted to 6.2 per cent of GNP in 2003, and 6.9 per cent in 2004. After 
contracting by 9.5 per cent in 2001, real GNP expanded by 7.9 per cent in 
2002, 5.9 per cent in 2003 and by 9.9 per cent in 2004. The unemployment 
rate, which reached 12.3 per cent in the first quarter of 2002, fell to I 0.3 per 
cent in 2004, and the average interest rate on government debt declined 
from 96.2 per cent in 2001 to 25. 7 per cent in 2004. Net public debt to GNP 
ratios are still high but have been falling, from 90.5 per cent of GNP in 2001 
to 70.4 per cent in 2003, and to 63.5 per cent in 2004, as a result of 
significant income growth, attainment of sizeable primary surpluses over 
the last three years, and appreciation of the real exchange rate (RER).2 
In 2004 the annual current account deficit amounted to about $15.5 
billion, and the current account deficit to GDP ratio was 5.1 per cent. The 
deficit is funded mainly by short-term funds, and foreign direct investment 
inflows remain weak. Total foreign debt in Turkey in 2004 reached $161. 7 
billion or 53.4 per cent of GDP, which reflects a significantly higher level of 
indebtedness than in other emerging countries. 3 
The purpose of this chapter is to study issues related to the sustainability 
of the current account in Turkey. While Section 9 .1 summarizes macroeco-
nomic developments during the last two and half decades, Section 9.2 analy-
ses issues related with sustainability of the current account. Section 9.3 
discusses policies for attaining current account sustainability. Section 9.4 
concludes. 
9.1 CURRENT ACCOUNT, REAL EXCHANGE RATE 
AND COMPETITIVENESS 
Figure 9.1 shows the developments in the current account to GDP ratio 
over the period 1975-2004. Turkey faced balance of payments crisis in the 
late 1970s, 1994 and 2001. The figure indicates that the probability of a 
balance of payments crisis increases in Turkey as the current account deficit 
to GDP ratio increases above a critical level of 5 per cent. Figure 9.2 shows 
the time path of the RER over the last two decades.4 The figure reveals four 
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episodes of RER developments. After the foreign exchange crisis of the late 
I 970s, the government pursued a policy of RER depreciation. 5 That policy 
continued until 1988. 
In 1989 foreign exchange operations and international capital move-
ments were liberalized. 6 During the 1990s, Turkey's public finances dete-
riorated considerably.7 Large public sector deficits were financed by 
borrowing from the market at very high real interest rates.8 Significant 
amounts of capital flowed into the country because it was offering not only 
high real interest rates but also the prospect of steady real appreciation of 
the exchange rate. Thus the government's implicit commitment to RER 
appreciation insured the private sector, domestic and foreign, against cur-
rency risk. The appreciation of the RER carried on under various coalition 
governments until 1994 when the country was faced with another currency 
crisis. The RER again depreciated sharply in April 1994, but thereafter it 
sta&ted to appreciate again. The appreciation of the RER carried on until 
February 2001, when the country faced yet another currency crisis. After 
the sharp depreciation of the RER from February to April 2001, the RER 
again began to appreciate, particularly after October 2001. It has appreci-
ated from October 2001 to October 2004 by about 30 per cent in parallel 
with a strong economic recovery. 
To study the factors determining the developments in the RER, we 
define the RER as (p* Elp), where p stands for the price level of the home 
country under consideration, p* the price level in rest of the world, and E 
the exchange rate defined as domestic currency units per foreign currency 
unit. Concentrating on the manufacturing sector we write the nominal 
value added in the manufacturing sector as the sum of labour and capital 
income, that is, p y = w L + r K where p stands for manufacturing sector 
value added deflator, y for real manufacturing value added, w for the 
nominal wage rate in the manufacturing sector, L for total employment in 
the manufacturing sector, r for the return on capital and K for the stock of 
capital in the manufacturing sector. Expressing capital income as r K = '11. 
(wL), where '11. stands for the mark-up rate in the manufacturing sector, the 
RER can be written as: 
(.l) Ew*(l + '11. *) 
Ep* L 
~ = ~( r-:~) _(1_+_'11._)_w_ pEw*(l + '11.*) p*w(l+'ll.)' 
where the variables with a star denote the corresponding variables in the 
foreign country, and p labour productivity in the home country's manufac-
turing sector. We note from: the above relation that developments in the 
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Figure 9.3 Factors affecting the real exchange rate, 1988-2003 
RER depend on developments in the productivity ratio pip*, the relative 
wage ratio Ew*lw, and the relative mark-up ratio (1 + X.*)l(l + X.). Thus, 
the competitiveness of the country as measured by the RER increases with 
a rise in the productivity ratio pip*, with a fall in the relative wage ratio 
wl Ew* and with a fall in the relative mark-up ratio (1 + X.)l(l + X. *). Figure 
9.3 shows the developments in relative wages wl Ew* relative productiv-
ities pip*, and relative mark-up ratio (1 + X.)1(1 + X.*) over the period 
1988-2003.9 The figure reveals that there is an increase in relative produc-
tivity levels and a decline in relative mark-up ratios where both factors have 
improved the competitiveness of the country. The results may largely be 
due to the opening of the economy to intense competition from abroad. 
As we have seen the RER depreciated considerably during the period 
1980-88. A drawback of the RER depreciation policy pursued during the 
1980s was the decline in real wages. By the second half of the 1980s, popular 
support for the government had begun to fall off. In the local elections of 
March 1989, the governing party suffered heavy losses. To increase political 
support, the government conceded substantial pay increases during collec-
tive bargaining in the public sector. Pressure then built up in the private 
sector to arrive at similarly high wage settlements, real wages began to 
increase and the RER started to appreciate. As a result of these develop-
ments, relative wages wlEw* increased considerably after 1988 leading to a 
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substantial decline in competitiveness. Since the increase in relative wages 
surpassed the positive effects of developments in relative productivities and 
mark-up rates on competitiveness, the RER appreciated. In 1994 when the 
country was faced with a balance of payments crisis, relative wages declined 
as the RER depreciated, but after 1994 the relative wage ratio wl Ew* started 
to increase again, surpassing the positive effects of changes in relative pro-
ductivities and relative mark-up rates on the competitiveness of Turkish 
products. In 2001, relative wages declined again with the sharp depreciation 
of the currency, but started to increase thereafter. 
9.2 SUSTAINABILITY OF THE CURRENT 
ACCOUNT 
The causes of the three balance of payments crises during late 1970s, 1994 
and 2001 were different. 10 Whatever the causes of the crises, we note that a 
widening of the current account deficit always occurred before an exchange 
rate crisis. The large current account deficits led to an accumulation of 
foreign debt that eventually became unsustainable and led to a currency 
crisis. Hence a major factor causing the crises was the unsustainability of 
the current account. 
Table 9. I shows the developments in ratios of GNP of savings, invest-
ment and current account from 1990-2004. Saving-investment gaps prior 
to both the 1994 and 200 I crises were considerable. During 1992-93 the 
average public savings-investment gap to GNP ratio amounted to -8.78 
per cent, and the average private savings-investment surplus to GNP ratio 
to 5.35 per cent. Similarly, the average public savings-investment gap to 
GNP ratio during 1999-2000 amounted to -12.76 per cent, and the 
average private savings-investment gap to GNP ratio to 8.2 per cent. With 
the stabilization measures in place, the gap between public savings-invest-
ment to GNP ratio declined to -4.73 per cent in 1994, but there was no 
similar decline after the 2001 crisis. During 2001 most of the adjustment 
was achieved by improvement in the private savings-investment surplus to 
GNP ratio. While private saving ratio did not change very much during 
2001 there was a considerable decline in the private investment ratio. 
The importance of current account imbalances and hence the excess of 
investments over savings as a warning signal of currency crisis has been 
emphasized by various authors including Corsetti et al. (1999), Radelet 
and Sachs (2000) and Edwards (2004). Among these authors Edwards 
shows that the probability of experiencing an abrupt current accounts 
reversal is linked to the size of the current account deficit and the level of 
external debt. 
Table 9.1 Saving, investment and current account to GNP ratio, 1990-2004(%) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Investment/GNP ratio 25.23 23.45 23.55 27.59 21.60 25.32 24.64 25.14 23.74 23.70 24.82 16.08 21.66 23.46 27.48 
Public investment to 8.63 7.61 6.76 7.29 3.64 3.81 5.32 6.35 6.80 6.59 6.99 5.46 6.30 4.78 4.76 
GNP ratio 
Private investment to 16.60 15.85 16.79 20.31 17.96 21.50 19.32 18.79 16.94 17 .11 17.84 10.62 15.37 18.68 22.71 
GNP ratio 
Savings/GNP ratio 22.03 21.35 21.58 22.74 23.07 22.09 19.82 21.34 22.68 21.20 18.20 17.42 19.02 19.28 22.09 
Public savings to GNP 3.43 0.72 -0.82 -2.68 -1.10 -0.08 -1.70 0.83 -1.89 -6.74 -5.20 -9.89 -6.23 -5.32 -1.91 
"" ratio ~ Private savings to GNP 18.60 20.64 22.37 25.43 24.17 22.17 21.52 20.51 24.57 27.94 23.40 27.31 25.25 24.59 24.00 
ratio 
Current account to GNP -3.20 -2.10 -2.00 -4.85 1.47 -3.23 -4.82 -3.80 -1.06 -2.51 -6.62 1.34 -2.64 -4.18 -5.38 
ratio 
Public savings-investment -5.20 -6.89 -7.58 -9.97 -4.73 -3.90 -7.03 -5.52 -8.69-13.33 -12.18 -15.35 -12.53 -10.09 -6.67 
gap to GNP ratio 
Private savings-investment 2.00 4.79 5.58 5.12 6.21 0.67 2.20 1.72 7.63 10.83 5.56 16.69 9.88 5.91 1.29 
gap to GNP ratio 
Notes: Figures for 2004 are preliminary. 
Source: State Planning Organization. 
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A simple definition of current account sustainability is the following: a 
current account position is sustainable as long as foreign investors are 
willing to finance it. But in light of the recent crises in Turkey as well as 
abroad it should be mentioned that the short-term debt poses special prob-
lems for the maintenance of financial stability. Serious problems occur 
when capital suddenly flows out of the country in the form of debt, port-
folio equity and even direct investment. But the macroeconomic conse-
quences are most disruptive when they involve debt, especially sovereign 
debt and debt within the banking and financial systems. Although defaults 
by individual enterprises on foreign currency debts are not generally a 
problem, large-scale defaults by much of the corporate sector can be very 
disruptive, especially in so far as they threaten the stability of the banking 
system. If investors suddenly lose confidence in the creditworthiness of a 
country, they may refuse to roll-over its stock of short-term debt, and the 
country will be forced to finance its debt service out of reserves or current 
account proceeds. If reserves and current account proceeds prove to be 
inadequate, a sharp current account reversal takes place. Inasmuch as 
domestic banks and corporations are rendered illiquid, the reversal can 
take place only through a severe and costly contraction of output. Thus, a 
high percentage of short-term debt increases the probability of sudden 
capital outflows leading to a crisis. 
In the following we consider the simple accounting methodology devel-
oped by Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1996) and make use of the balance of 
payments relation written as TBJ-i*D1_,+FDl1 +D1 -D1_ 1 =t::..R1 
where TB$ denotes the noninterest current account, i* the foreign rate of 
interest, D the stock of foreign debt, FD/the net foreign direct investment, 
R the foreign exchange reserves of the country, and t::..R1 the change in 
reserves. Also (TBJ- i*D1_ 1) = CurrentAccount1 and (FD/1 + D1 - D1_ 1) 
= CapitalAccount1• All variables are measured in terms of foreign currency. 
If d1 = Ep/p1y 1 is the foreign debt to GDP ratio, tb1 = E1TB~lp1y 1 the non-
interest current account to GDP ratio, fdi1 = FD/1E/p1y 1 the FDI to GDP 
ratio, and t::..r1 = (t::..R1)E/p1y 1 the change in reserves to GDP ratio, the equa-
tion determining the time path of d1 can be written as: 
(l + r*)( l + 'l"J) . 
d1 = -tb1 + (l + g) d1_ 1 - fd1 1 + t::..r1 (9.1) 
where r* denotes the foreign real rate of interest and 1"J the rate of depreci-
ation of the RER. The equation reveals that the external debt to GDP ratio 
decreases with increases in the noninterest current account to GDP ratio 
th, the FOi to GDP ratio fdi, and the growth rate of GDP g. By contrast, 
the debt to GDP ratio increases with increases in the foreign real interest 
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rate r*, rate of depreciation of the RER Ti, and changes in the reserves 
to GDP ratio /:J,.r. 
Following the approach of von Hagen and Harden (1994), we solve the 
difference equation determining the time path of d1 forward for n periods 
and obtain: 
dr = f/\ndt+n + f1 f 01,;A1+; 
i=l 
- k 1 + g; 
where 01,k - TI (1 + r*)( 1 + .) 
i=l I TJ, 
(9.2) 
and A1 = tb1 + fdi1 - /:J,.rr Here, 01k can be interpreted as the 'k-periods 
ahead' discount factor used to calctilate the present value of assets and lia-
bilities in period t + k for period t. f 1x 1+k denotes the period t expectation 
of the variable x in period t + k. The equation shows that current debt to 
GDP ratio equals the expected discounted present value of foreign debt 
outstanding in period t+ n relative to GDP, plus the sum of all discounted 
A/s between period t and period t + n. 
To translate the intertemporal budget constraint into a practically more 
relevant requirement we consider the budget constraint for a limited 
period of time n* and add the sustainability condition that the discounted 
debt/GDP ratio at the end of period t+n*, discounted dt+n*' should 
not exceed the debt/GDP ratio at time t, dr We say current account is not 
sustainable if: 
11 
S(n*) = dt - rtol,ndt+n = rl Lot,iAt+i< 0. 
i=l 
(9.3) 
But this sustainability condition, while useful, is not easy to assess in prac-
tice. Even under initial negative A 1 values over the next few years the current 
account can be said to be sustainable if during the latter periods large 
positive noninterest current account to GDP and FDI to GDP and thus 
A 1+; values are assumed. Consider the year 2004. During that year we had 
the following values for the variables under consideration: d2004 = 53.45 per 
cent, tb2004 = - 3.54 per cent,/di2004 = 0.62 per cent, /:J,.r2004 = 1.44 per cent, 
A 2004 = -4.35 per cent, g2004 = 8.9 percent, T]2004 = -6.45 percent and r* 2004 
= 5.2 per cent. If the value of A 2004+; over the next few years, say three 
years, were to remain negative the present value f 1L/'.c 101 ;Ai+; could turn 
out to be positive if one were to assume sufficiently large positive future 
noninterest current account to GDP and FDI to GDP values over the latter 
periods, namely from 2008 onwards. Current account will then turn out to 
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be sustainable. The analysis thus depends on the assumptions one makes 
about the evolution of A 2004+; over time. 
In the following we assume the continuation of the present policies into 
the future. In particular we introduce the following assumptions. We 
assume that n* = 10, and that the government, private sector, and rest of 
the world will not change the policies they pursue in period 2004 over the 
time period 2005 to 2014. In addition we assume that there will be no 
accumulation/decumulation of international reserves and that the 
country will neither depreciate nor appreciate the RER over the next ten 
years so that Llr,+;=0 and 11,+;=0 for i= 1, ... , 10. We suppose that the 
values of tb1+; andfdi1+; for i= 1, ... , 10 will remain unchanged at their 
initial values of tb2004 andfdi2004• Furthermore we assume that real GDP 
will grow at the average rate of 4.1 per cent annually and that foreign real 
interest rate equals 6.86 per cent over the next 10 years. 11 Finally, we 
assume that Llr2004 = 0 so that A2004 = -2.92 per cent rather than the 
actual value of A2004 = -4.36 per cent. We then calculate the value of debt 
to GDP ratio in 2014 using the difference equation (9.1) and then the 
value of the sustainability measure (9.3). 
When over the next 10 years A2004+; stays constant at -2.92 per cent, 
current account in 2004 turns out to be unsustainable in the sense that the 
actual debt to GDP ratio in 2004 falls short of the expected discounted 
present value of foreign debt outstanding in period 2014 by 25.31 per cent. 
The sustainability of the current account requires that the value of the sus-
tainability measure be increased so that it becomes positive. This goal can 
be achieved either through an increase in the noninterest current account 
to GDP ratio tb1 or through an increase in the FDI to GDP ratiofdi1 during 
the period 2005-14 or through a combination of increases in both the non-
interest current account to GDP and FDI to GDP ratios. For Turkey to 
achieve the minimal condition for external sustainability, the value of A 1 
during each time period of the interval 2005-14 would have to be O per cent. 
Thus Turkey has to increase the sum of its noninterest current account to 
GDP ratio and its FDI to GDP ratio during each period of the interval 
2005-14 by at least 2.92 per cent. 
Suppose first thatfdi1 during the time period 2005-14 remains constant 
at its 2004 level of 0.62 per cent. Economic theory tells us that the non-
interest current account to GDP ratio can be increased by decreasing aggre-
gate demand for domestic goods and services and/or by depreciating the 
RER. Decreasing the aggregate demand for goods and services requires 
that the country uses contractionary policies. But Turkey, as of the begin-
ning of 2005, was already in the midst of a determined campaign to turn 
around decades of weak performance due to pervasive structural rigidities 
and weak public finances. Aiming for more ambitious fiscal objective than 
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the constant primary surplus of 6.5 per cent of GNP will be very painful 
after so many failed stabilization attempts. The alternative is to depreciate 
the RER and keep the RER around its 'long-run equilibrium level' over 
time. To determine the extent of depreciation in the RER required for 
achieving current account sustainability we consider the elasticity of the 
ratio of noninterest current account to GDP with respect to the RER, 
e -(dNICA!GDP RER ) 
- dRER NICA!GDP 
Then starting from initial trade balance we derive that: 
e = (11;,n + 11exp - 1), 
where 11;m and 11exp denote the import and export elasticities with respect to 
the RER. Estimates based on estimated Turkish import and export equa-
tions range quite widely. Here we consider the estimates of Tansel and 
Togan (1987) who determine the export price elasticity as 0.933 and import 
price elasticity as 0.472. Thus, 0 = 0.405. Considering the ratio of exports 
to GDP of 19.6 per cent, the parameter values imply that a reduction of the 
ratio of noninterest current account to GDP of 1 per cent requires a depre-
ciation of the RER by 12.6 per cent. Thus sustainability of the current 
account requires that the RER be depreciated by 36.8 per cent. 
Note that the above results were derived under the condition that 
A 2004+; = 0 for i= 1, .... , 10. Solving the difference equation (9.1) for the 
value of debt to GDP ratio in 2014 with the values of tb2004 +; = -0.62 per 
cent,fdi2004+;= 0.62 per cent, Ar2004+; = 0 per cent, g2004+;= 4.1 per cent, 
r* 2004 +; = 6.86 per cent and 112004+ i = 0 per cent we note that the debt to 
GDP ratio increases from its value of 53.45 per cent in 2004 to 69.43 per 
cent in 2014. The increase in debt to GDP ratio is thus perfectly compat-
ible with the sustainability condition specified above. 
An alternative specification of the sustainability condition requires that 
the ratio of the stock of foreign liabilities to GDP stay constant over time 
at its initial value in time period 2004. In that case, the equation determin-
ing the time path of the debt to GDP ratio d can be solved for the equilib-
rium value of the sum of tb andfdi, under the assumption that Ar = 0, as: 
(tb + fdi) = -[(g -r* - 11 - r*11)]d 
(1 + g) 
where 11 denotes the rate of depreciation of the RER, g the growth rate 
of real GDP and r* the foreign real interest rate. Considering the same 
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parameter values as before, the equilibrium value of (tb + fdi) is determined 
to be 1.42 per cent. 12 Because in 2004 the actual value of (tb1 + fdi,) 
equalled -2.92 per cent, Turkey needs to increase the sum of its noninter-
est current account to GDP and FDI to GDP ratios over time by 4.34 per 
cent. Suppose again that f di1 over time stays constant at its 2004 level of 
0.62 per cent. Then the increase in tb1, and thus in A, over time, can be 
achieved by depreciating the RER by 54. 7 per cent. 
Finally, following the suggestion of Reinhart et al. (2003), we consider a 
case in which the country tries to decrease its ratio of stock of foreign liabil-
ities to GDP from its initial value of 53.45 per cent to 40 per cent over a period 
of 10 years. In that case, Turkey has to increase the sum of its noninterest 
current account to GDP ratio and its FDI to GDP ratio over time by 5.53 per 
cent. This change, under the assumption thatfdi1 over time stays constant at 
its 2004 level, requires that the RER be depreciated by 69.7 per cent. 
Once Turkey is able to attract higher levels of FDI into the country, it 
does not need to depreciate its currency by as much as 36.8 or 69. 7 per cent 
in order to attain sustainability in its current account. 13 With increases in 
the FDI to GDP ratios, the depreciation rate of the RER required to attain 
sustainability in the current account decreases. When the FDI to GDP ratio 
increases to 3 per cent of GDP, then the system becomes sustainable under 
the approach of von Hagen and Harden (1994) when the RER is depreci-
ated by 6. 7 per cent. On the other hand when the ratio of the stock of 
foreign liabilities to GDP stays constant over time at its initial value in time 
period 2004, the system becomes sustainable when the RER is depreciated 
by 24. 7 per cent. Finally, to reduce the debt to GDP ratio to 40 per cent over 
a period of 10 years, the RER needs to be depreciated by 39.7 per cent. 
Finally, in order to determine the robustness of the analysis we consider 
pessimistic and optimistic scenarios. Under the pessimistic scenario we 
assume that g = 0.031 and r* = 0.0786 and under the optimistic scenario we 
have g=0.051 and r*=0.0586. Under pessimistic (optimistic) scenario 
when the FDI to GDP ratio stays constant at 0.62 per cent of GDP over 
the period 2005-14, the system becomes sustainable under the approach of 
von Hagen and Harden (1994) when the RER is depreciated as before by 
36.8 per cent. On the other hand when the ratio of the stock of foreign lia-
bilities to GDP stays constant over time at its initial value in time period 
2004, the system becomes sustainable when the RER is depreciated by 67.9 
(41.6) per cent. Finally, to reduce the debt to GDP ratio to 40 per cent over 
a period of 10 years, the RER needs to be depreciated by 81.6 (58.1) per 
cent. When the FDI to GDP ratio increases over time from its value of 0.62 
per cent, the required rate of depreciation of the RER in order to attain 
sustainability in the current account decreases with increases in the FDI 
to GDP ratio. 
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9.3 POLICIES FOR ATTAINING CURRENT 
ACCOUNT SUSTAINABILITY 
The sustainability analysis in Section 9.2 reveals that the exchange rate as 
of the beginning of 2005 was overvalued. According to Eichengreen and 
Choudhry in Chapter 8 of this book the standard advice in such a situation 
would be: (i) increasing exchange rate flexibility, (ii) maintaining capital 
account restrictions, (iii) strengthening prudential supervision, (iv) steriliz-
ing inflows, (v) loosening monetary policy, (vi) tightening fiscal policy and 
(vii) negotiating a programme with the IMF. Currently, the Turkish 
exchange rate regime is an independent float. The Central Bank of Turkey 
(CBT) intervenes in the foreign exchange market in a strictly limited 
fashion to prevent excessive volatility without targeting a certain trend 
level. Regarding the second point we note that Turkey is committed not to 
impose any restrictions on capital account transactions. Regarding the 
third point it should be stressed that the soundness of the banking system 
is considered by Turkey as an important element for attaining a sustainable 
regime for capital movements. The country has been trying to develop 
effective systems of supervision and, in particular, the necessary adminis-
trative capacity to enforce the rules since the 2001 financial crisis. It realizes 
that both domestic and international banks operating in the country 
should be sound and stable institutions. 14 Regarding the fourth point we 
note that the CBT has purchased foreign exchange through market-friendly 
auctions: the mechanism through which the CBT purchased foreign 
exchange and how much it was going to purchase daily were set in advance 
and announced. Whenever the reverse dollarization process and capital 
inflows stopped, the CBT also stopped opening purchase auctions. In other 
words, it has not been aggressive in reserve accumulation. Through foreign 
exchange purchase auctions, the CBT purchased (as mentioned by Ozatay, 
in Chapter 5 of this book) $0.8 billion in 2002, $5. 7 billion in 2003, and $4.1 
billion in 2004. CBT did not open purchase auctions in 9 months in 2002, 
6 months in 2003 and 7 months in 2004. During 2005 CBT intended to 
have daily auctions where it will buy foreign exchange between minimum 
and maximum amounts. These pre-announced amounts have been set as 
$15 million and $45 million daily. Regarding the fifth point it should be 
emphasized that Turkey is following an implicit inflation targeting policy 
and will introduce inflation targeting explicitly in 2006. Monetary policy 
will be used for attaining the inflation target. Regarding the sixth point we 
note that Turkey is following tight fiscal policy. It is committed to keeping 
the primary surplus at 6.5 per cent of GDP over the next three years. 
Aiming for a more ambitious fiscal objective than the constant primary 
surplus of 6.5 per cent of GDP will be very painful. Finally, Turkey has 
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recently negotiated another 3-year stand-by arrangement with the IMF. 
Thus Turkey has been trying to follow the policies under (i), (iii), (vi), (vii) 
and also partially (iv). 
If Turkey intends to reverse the appreciation of the RER and attain sus-
tainability in the current account there seem to be, in principle, three feasi-
ble policy alternatives: (1) taking measures to increase FDI inflow into 
Turkey, (2) changing the exchange rate regime from independent float to 
crawling bands or managed float and (3) imposing restrictions on capital 
account transactions. 
9.3.1 Foreign Direct Investment Policies 
One of the main culprits behind the failure of Turkey to attract large FDI 
inflows was the uncertain macroeconomic environment, which, along 
with the uncertainties stemming from domestic politics and the ensuing 
high real interest rates, produced a very erratic growth performance. 
Infrastructure-related factors were in play as well. Although the quantity 
and quality of Turkey's broadly defined infrastructure, including its 
geographic and demographic endowments and its physical and financial 
infrastructure, help to position Turkey as a potentially powerful magnet 
for FDI inflows, these factors were ineffective in Turkey's effort to 
increase those flows. According to the Foreign Investment Advisory 
Service (2001a, 2001b) seven major problems impeded the operations of 
FDI enterprises up until the early 2000s: (i) political instability, (ii) gov-
ernment hassle, (iii) a weak judicial system, (iv) heavy taxation, (v) cor-
ruption, (vi) deficient infrastructure and (vii) competition from the 
informal economy. 
On the other hand, according to Dutz et al. (2005) the main bottle-
necks seemed to have been insufficient respect for the rule of law and 
weak competition in local markets, reinforced by an uneven application 
of bureaucratic red tape. Finally, OECD (2004) maintains that Turkey, in 
addition to the factors mentioned above, needs to eliminate unfair com-
petition from the informal economy. 15 Thus, Turkey, in order to attract 
higher levels of FDI flows in the future, has to improve its political sta-
bility and its macroeconomic environment, increase respect for the rule of 
law, re-evaluate the legal framework governing the privatization pro-
grammes, create a clear understanding with employee unions on the 
labour relations framework, increase competition in local markets, reduce 
bureaucratic red tape, and take measures to reduce the informal sector. 16 
The above considerations reveal that Turkey could attain sustainability 
in the current account by taking appropriate measures to increase the 
inflow of FD I inflow over time. 17 
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9.3.2 Exchange Rate Policy 
The sustainability analysis in Section 9.2 reveals that the currency needs 
to be depreciated. But any depreciation of the currency will result in 
offsetting forces, deflationary and expansionary. First, home produced 
goods will become more competitive, both in the domestic market against 
imports and in foreign markets where exports gain a competitive edge. 
This effect will be expansionary. Second, devaluation will cause an 
increase in the domestic price level and this will reduce the real value of 
the money supply, which is contractionary. Third, since the country has 
taken loans denominated in a foreign currency, devaluation will increase 
the value of debts in terms of domestic currency. Unless these loans were 
contracted by agents with export income there will be no corresponding 
increase in the ability to service debt. Furthermore, where a relatively high 
percentage of public debt is denominated in foreign currency, devaluation 
will result in increases in debt to GDP ratio of the public sector as well 
as in increases of foreign debt to GDP ratio for the whole economy. Thus, 
this effect will be contractionary. Fourth, there may be indirect contrac-
tionary effects of this, in reducing the value of stocks (equities) and, if the 
solvency of the financial sector is threatened, deterring domestic lending. 
Fifth, the country will have to contract foreign loans in order to cover 
any current account deficit that remains and in order to roll-over matur-
ing loans. This will occur in an environment where foreign confidence 
in the worth of the government's word has just been undermined by a 
devaluation undertaken in defiance of its previous commitments. This 
may require some combination of high interest rates, which will be 
contractionary. 
Turning to the question of which exchange rate regime the country 
should choose in order to attain sustainability in the current account, the 
situation as of the beginning of 2005 suggested that Turkey should avoid 
adopting a fixed exchange rate regime since the country still faced fiscal 
problems, inflation was higher than in competitor countries, the country 
had not completely resolved its problems in the banking sector and the 
current account was unsustainable. A fixed exchange rate regime would 
make the situation worse. Thus, exchange rate regimes with no separate 
legal tender - including regimes with another currency as legal tender 
(formal dollarization or euroization) and currency unions, currency board, 
and conventional fixed pegs - should not be alternatives for Turkey during 
the pre-accession period until the conditions improve. 18 The country 
should also not use horizontal bands since the inflation rate is still high 
relative to the inflation rates in major partner countries. On the other hand 
an independent float in the case of Turkey has led to the problems of 
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sustainability of the current account. Since during the pre-accession period 
Turkey will further liberalize capital transactions, achieving sustainability 
in the current account will become more and more important as time 
passes. Hence, an independent float should also not be an alternative for 
Turkey. Among the intermediate regimes Turkey could in principle choose 
between crawling pegs, managed float or crawling band regimes. But a 
crawling peg regime should also be not an alternative. 19 Last time Turkey 
adopted the crawling peg with a foreign exchange regime close to currency 
board, the system failed in 2001, as Turkey had neither a sound fiscal frame-
work nor a sound banking sector and had not attained price stability. In 
addition the exchange rate at the beginning of the stabilization period was 
not set at the competitive equilibrium exchange rate, and the country did 
not depreciate the exchange rate fast enough to attain its long-run equilib-
rium level. Furthermore, since the determination of the competitive equi-
librium exchange rate is not easy, and it can be determined at best with an 
error margin, a crawling peg would not be an appropriate exchange regime 
for Turkey. Thus, in principle, Turkey could choose between crawling band 
and managed float regimes. 
The crawling band system consists of a rule on the determination of the 
peg, the choice of parity, a rule for changing the parity, and a band around 
the parity within which the rate floats. 
Choice of peg and intervention currency Under a crawling peg regime the 
country needs to decide whether to peg to a single foreign currency or to a 
currency basket. In the case of Turkey it would be sensible to use a basket 
of currencies as a peg. Such a basket could contain the currencies of major 
competitors of Turkey in world markets as well as of major suppliers of 
imported commodities. The countries could consist, as in the determina-
tion of the RER, of various countries in Western Europe, of different coun-
tries in America, of various countries in Central and Eastern European and 
the Commonwealth of Independent States, of different countries in Asia, 
and of some of the countries in Middle Eastern and North African coun-
tries. The weights of different countries could be determined using the 
approach of Zanello and Desruelle (1997). Since the operation of the 
crawling band also requires the choice of a currency in which to intervene 
when necessary, Turkey could use either the US dollar or the euro as the 
intervention currency. 
The choice of parity The choice of parity is a perennial source of tension 
between those who want a strong exchange rate to serve as a nominal 
anchor in curbing inflation and those who want a more competitive rate 
in the interest of promoting exports and strengthening the balance of 
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payments. It is our contention that the parity should be determined from 
considerations of competitive equilibrium exchange rate as explained 
above in Section 9.2 on sustainability of the current account. 
Choice of rate of crawl Experience suggests the changes in parity will have 
to be small and very frequent. The rate of crawl could be determined from 
the formula: 
j = Inflation target - expected foreign inflation rate 
when the country is interested in keeping the RER constant over time. In 
that case we deduct from the inflation target the expected foreign inflation 
rate and obtain the rate of change of the central parity. Alternatively, one 
could use the formula: 
j = Inflation target - expected foreign inflation rate 
- estimated productivity growth differential 
In this case we deduct from the inflation target the expected foreign 
inflation and the difference between productivity growths in the home and 
foreign countries. By determining the rate of change of the central rate by 
this formula the country tries to keep the relative wages w/ Ew* constant 
over time. 
Choice of band width The fourth parameter to be considered is the 
choice of band width. A wide band allows a capital inflow to push the 
exchange rate a considerable way before reaching the bottom of the band. 
Williamson (1996), who has studied the crawling band experiences of 
Chile, Colombia and Israel, notes that Chile has widened its band in a series 
of steps, from 0.5 to 2 to 3 to 5 to 10 per cent on either side of the parity. 
Similarly, Israel in January 1989 chose a band width of + /- 3 per cent. In 
March 1990 the band was widened to + /- 5 per cent, and to + /- 7 per cent 
in May 1995. Similarly, Turkey could choose a relatively wide band width. 
The reason for the choice of the wide band lies in the fact that it is impos-
sible to know exactly the equilibrium exchange rate. Countries need scope 
to discourage unwelcome capital inflows without jeopardizing their mone-
tary policy. Therefore a crawling band width of + /- 7 to + /- 10 per cent 
seems to be the preferred band width for Turkey. 
Under the crawling band, Israel since the late 1980s and 1990s and 
Poland since the mid-1990s, pledged to intervene when the exchange rate 
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hit pre-announced margins on either side of central parity. In both cases 
the rate of crawl has been pre-announced for up to a year in advance, with 
the objective of influencing expectations and price-setting behaviour. 
Experience shows that crawling bands function best when there is also 
readiness to adjust the central parity and rate of crawl in a timely manner 
in response to changing economic fundaments. On the other hand, it is 
sometimes stressed that even if there is no commitment by the central bank 
to maintain the limits, statements by the central bank offering guidance to 
the reasonable limits of the exchange rate, taking fundamentals into 
account, will affect market behaviour. But such procedures would come 
under the headings of managed floating. 
A country can use a wide range of instruments, including sterilized and 
unsterilized interventions, to defend its exchange rate band. In Israel, ster-
ilized interventions have been directed to defending an inner band. 
Authorities intervened within the inner band to reduce volatility, and 
thereby discouraged the rate from approaching the edge of the band. 
Outside the inner band interventions were used more progressively to push 
the rate back towards the middle of the band. Countries have also used 
unsterilized interventions to defend the band. Furthermore countries could 
use interest rate policy and also change the reserve requirements to which 
commercial banks are subject in order to defend the band. 
On the other hand the managed float, also known as a dirty float, is 
defined as a readiness to intervene in the foreign exchange market, without 
defending any particular parity. There is no commitment to an exchange 
rate. Most intervention is intended to lean against the wind - buying the 
currency when it is rising and selling when it is falling. A managed floater 
responds to a I per cent change in demand for its currency by partial 
accommodation - changing the supply of currency by say a per cent and 
letting the rest of the change in demand show up in the price. When a is 
close to 1, the exchange rate is fixed; when it is close to 0, the rate is floating. 
The aim under managed float as emphasized by Corden (2002) is to stab-
ilize exchange rate movements occasionally, or at least moderate 
fluctuations, and avoid extreme movements. Since there is no explicit com-
mitment by the central bank, there is never a danger of losing credibility. 
This property gives policymakers discretion in exchange rate policy. They 
might have an informal target concept such as the crawling band in mind, 
but the limits of the band are not made public. Thus, the country can 
pursue an implicit rather than a formal or announced target zone. This kind 
of regime would be attractive for Turkey because of the discretion it will 
allow governments. 
The above considerations reveal that Turkey could attain sustainability 
in the current account and thus the long-run equilibrium level of the RER 
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by discontinuing the regime of an independent float and adopting either a 
crawling band or managed float regime. In 2005 the Turkish Central Bank 
was focusing its primary attention on reducing the inflation rate, and was 
in the process of formally adopting the 2006 inflation targeting regime. But 
the Central Bank, besides targeting the inflation rate must also have the 
objective of maintaining a sustainable current account deficit, and hence 
targeting the RER. 
9.3.3 Policy on Capital Account Transactions 
A major instrument which countries have used to attain sustainability in 
the current account and then to sustain it over time is the use of capital con-
trols, which has taken a variety of forms. An interesting experiment is that 
of Chile. During 1990-97 Chile was the recipient of massive capital inflows. 
In order to avoid large appreciation of the currency the authorities imple-
mented capital controls on inflows and liberalized outflows. In 1991 Chile 
introduced the Unremunerated Deposit Requirement (UDR). The UDR 
applied to almost all foreign borrowing except foreign direct investment 
inflows and trade credit. It applied to both short-term and long-term loans 
and to portfolio investment, such as purchases of stocks. At first 20 per cent 
of the relevant foreign borrowing had to be deposited in non-interest 
bearing deposits with the central bank for a period of 3 to 12 months, 
depending on the maturity and nature of the credit. The implicit tax would 
fall the lengthier the maturity of the loan, which reflected the objective that 
short-term inflows should be reduced more than long-term inflows. In 1992 
the proportion was raised to 30 per cent and the period was set at 12 months 
regardless of the term of the credit. Later UDR was reduced and finally in 
1998 it was brought down to zero. Eichengreen et al. (1998) maintain that 
the evidence on the effectiveness of the controls in reducing the short-term 
external debt is somewhat ambiguous. On the other hand Edwards 
(1998) and Cowan and De Gregorio (2005) emphasize that the introduc-
tion of UDR had the desired effect of reducing the share of short-term 
capital inflows. 
Eichengreen (2003a) points out that in most of the developing coun-
tries monetary and fiscal institutions lack credibility, the regulators 
lack administrative capacity, the financial markets are shallow, and they 
cannot borrow abroad in domestic currency. So long as these conditions 
are present, there are arguments for capital controls to limit the risks 
to the financial system. Capital flows should not be freed before 
progress has been made in liberalizing domestic financial markets and 
strengthening prudential supervision. This in turn means, according to 
Eichengreen (2003b), liberalizing, first, foreign direct investment, second, 
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access to stock and bond markets, and finally, offshore bank funding. As 
developing countries take necessary measures to strengthen their financial 
systems, rationalize prudential supervision, achieve sound and stable 
fiscal policy and attain price stability they should remove capital controls. 
Thereafter capital account liberalization will help more than it hurts. 
Table 9.2 shows the controls prevailing in 2003 on different types of 
capital transactions in Central and Eastern European countries and 
Turkey. The table reveals that Hungary has the most liberal capital trans-
actions regime, and that Poland and Turkey the most restrictive among the 
countries under consideration. In Poland and Turkey there were eight 
types of capital transactions subject to controls, with a restrictiveness 
value of 73 per cent. Hungary has a restrictiveness value of only 9 per cent. 
Here we should note that Turkey liberalized international capital move-
ments in 1989, and accepted the obligations of Article VIII of the 
Agreement of the IMF on 22 March 1990. In Turkey a number of sectors, 
such as broadcasting, aviation, marine transport, port and financial ser-
vices are subject to FOi restrictions. Recently Turkey has opened up the 
broadcasting sector to foreign competition and has also removed restric-
tions on the acquisition of real estate. 
Regarding the policy on capital controls we note that in order to attain 
sustainability on the current account, Turkey could, in principle, introduce 
holding-period taxes as in Chile as a form of prudential supervision, until 
banks' risk management practices and regulatory oversight have been 
upgraded. 20 
9.4 CONCLUSION 
Under perfect capital mobility there will be the unavoidable risk of attacks 
on the currency unless the country resolves its fiscal problems, attains price 
stability, achieves a sound banking sector, and the RER does not deviate 
considerably from its long-run equilibrium value. During the last few years 
Turkey has been trying hard to resolve its fiscal problems, attain price sta-
bility and achieve a sound banking sector. The remaining issue concerns the 
attainment of sustainability in the current account. Turkey could achieve 
this objective by adopting measures that will increase FOi inflows into the 
country, changing the exchange rate regime from independent float to 
either a managed float or crawling band regime, and by introducing restric-
tions on capital movements. 
Table 9.2 Restrictions on capital transactions in Central and Eastern European countries and Turkey, 2003 
Bulgaria Czech Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Turkey 
Republic 
Capital market X X X + X 
securities 
Money market X X + X 
instruments 
Collective investment X X X 
securities 
Derivatives and other X X 
instruments 
Commercial credits X + X 
Financial credits X X + X 
i-., 
Guarantees, sureties X X + gg 
and financial backup 
facilities 
Direct investments X X X X X X X 
Liquidation of + X 
direct investment 
Real estate X X X X X X X X X X X 
transactions 
Personal capital X X X X + X 
transactions 
Restrictiveness index 45 27 18 9 18 27 73 36 45 73 
Notes: X denotes that there are restrictions, and+ indicates that the specific practice is not regulated. Higher values of restrictiveness index 
indicates more restrictions on capital transactions. 
Source: Exchange Rate Arrangements and Restrictions (IMF). 
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NOTES 
* The authors gratefully acknowledge the comments of Jiirgen von Hagen and Emin 
Oztiirk. We are particularly in debt to Manfred Neumann, whose comments helped us 
to correct several errors in an earlier draft. However, the views expressed in this paper 
are the authors' sole responsibility. 
I. There were huge distortions created by the state banks, which had substantial shares in 
the banking sector's total assets. These banks faced unrecovered costs from duties carried 
out on behalf of the government and they covered their financing needs from markets 
by borrowing at high interest rates and short maturities. In addition some banks started 
to borrow funds from abroad with which they bought government bonds and treasury 
2. 
3. 
bills which yielded high real interest returns. 
Fiscal deficit, primary balance and debt figures are obtained from IMF (2005), and all 
other data from the web sites of State Planning Organization (www.dpt.gov.tr) and 
Undersecretariat of the Treasury (www.hazine.gov.tr). 
Foreign debt to GDP ratio amounted to 71.4 per cent in 2002 and 61 per cent in 2003. 
The large decrease in debt to GDP ratio is mainly due to real exchange rate (RER) 
appreciation. 
4. When constructing real exchange rate indices one is faced with four decisions: choice of 
the price index, choice of the currency basket, choice of weights and choice of mathe-
matical formula. In the formulation of the real exchange rate we use CPI, as CPI data 
are available on a monthly basis for a large number of countries. Choice of currency 
basket is composed of countries which are major competitors of Turkey in world 
markets as well as major suppliers of imported commodities to Turkey. The countries 
considered consist in Western Europe of Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and the UK; in America of Brazil, Canada, 
Mexico and the USA; in Central and Eastern European countries and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Russia; in Asia of China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand; and 
in Middle Eastern and North African countries of Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. For 
weights assigned to different countries and formula used for estimation of RER we use 
5. 
the approach developed by Zanello and Desruelle (1997). 
Until the end of the 1970s, Turkey followed a fixed and multiple exchange rate policy 
while experiencing relatively high inflation rates. The policy led to a loss of competi-
tiveness and eventually to the foreign exchange crisis of the late 1970s. GNP shrank by 
0.5 per cent in 1979 and by 2.8 per cent in 1980. With the stabilization measures of 1980, 
Turkey devalued its lira by I 00 per cent and eliminated the multiple exchange rate 
system. After May 1981, the exchange rate was adjusted daily against major currencies 
to maintain the competitiveness of Turkish exports. Multiple currency practices were 
phased out during the first two years of the 1980 stabilization programme, and the gov-
ernment pursued a policy of depreciating the RER - on average by about 6 per cent 
annually over the period 1980-88. 
6. Turkey opened the capital account in 1989 before it had taken measures to upgrade 
banking and financial market supervision and regulation, adopt international auditing 
and accounting standards, strengthen corporate governance and shareholder rights and 
modernize bankruptcy and insolvency procedures. 
7. The average budget deficit measured by the public sector borrowing requirements to 
GNP ratio amounted to 9.6 per cent during 1990-2000. 
8. The real interest rate is defined as 
[{ 
( i, )}-!] I+ Too 
r, = I + ( l~O) * 100, 
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where i, denotes the annual rate of interest on government bonds and treasury bills, 
attained as the weighted average rate in auctions during the month t weighted by total 
sales during the month, and 7r1 denotes the expected annual rate of inflation at time t 
over the period t to t + 12. In the calculations of the real interest rate, we set the expected 
annual rate of inflation at time t over the period t tot+ 12 equal to the actual annual rate 
of inflation over the period t to t + 12. The average level of real interest rates over the 
period January 199 l to March 1993 amounted to 9 per cent, and between February 1994 
and October 2003 to 25.5 per cent. 
9. The data for wage rates have been obtained from AMECO, the European Commission 
Annual Macroeconomic Database, http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy _finance/ 
indicators/annual_macro_economic_database/ameco_en.htm. 
The foreign wage has been determined as the weighted average of the wage rates in 
Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. On the other hand the data for labour productivity have been 
obtained from US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Database, 
http://www.bls.gov/fls/home.htm. Foreign productivity has been determined as the 
weighted average of the productivity of the above countries. 
10. Eichengreen (2004) summarizes the factors leading to financial crises under the headings 
of unsustainable macroeconomic policies, fragile financial systems, institutional weak-
nesses, and flaws in the structure of international financial markets. Thus, countries 
suffer currency crises because they run inconsistent and unsustainable macroeconomic 
policies. Fragile financial systems indicate that balance sheet vulnerabilities put banks, 
non-bank financial institutions, corporations and other borrowers at risk when 
confidence erodes and capital begins to haemorrhage out of the financial system. 
Institutional weaknesses refer to weak corporate and public sector governance issues, 
which allow excessive risk-taking, resulting in vulnerable financial structures. Finally, 
flaws in the structure of international financial markets refer to sudden stops and capital 
flow reversals that can cause crises independently of conditions in the afflicted 
economies. In Turkey the crises of late l 970 and of 1994 occurred mainly because of 
unsustainable macroeconomic policies. In the case of the 200 I crisis the main factors 
causing the crisis were unsustainable macroeconomic policies, fragile financial systems, 
and institutional weaknesses. 
1 I. A look at Turkey's annual GDP growth rate over the period 1980-2004 reveals that 
the average growth rate of GDP amounted to 4. l per cent during 1980-89 and again 
4.1 per cent during 1990-2004. Hence, for the growth rate of GDP over the time period 
2004 to 20 l 4 we take the figure of 4.1 per cent. On the other hand, we determine the 
foreign interest rate from Eurobond issues of the Turkish Treasury. The average rate of 
return on Turkish US$ Euro bonds during the time of issue was I 0.13 per cent in 1998, 
12.08 per cent during 1999, 11.61 per cent in 2000, 11.35 in 2001, 10.66 per cent in 2002, 
10.08 in 2003 and 8.06 per cent in 2004. By deflating the nominal return figures by US 
CPI inflation rates observed during the following period we obtain, as the average figure 
for the time period 1998-2004, 7.84 per cent, and for the time period 2002-04, 6.86 per 
cent. In the calculations we set the value of foreign real interest rate as 6.86 per cent. We 
would like to thank Tekin <;::otuk of the Undersecretariat of the Treasury for providing 
the data on Turkish Eurobonds. 
12. We assume as before that TJ = 0 and set the values of the parameters as g = 0.041, 
r* = 0.0686, and d2004= 0.5345 for the year 2004. 
13. The formulation of the sustainability problem through equation (9.1) assumes that FDI 
is a surer and safer form of external financing. Thus the analysis in the chapter assumes 
that current account deficits financed mainly by FDI inflows do not lead to problems of 
sustainability of the current account. But if FDI takes the form of purchases of stocks 
and if these shares can be liquidated easily in domestic markets, then it is possible to take 
the money out of the country as in other forms of investment. In those cases FDI makes 
no difference and there is no reason to separate FDI flows in equation (9.1 ). Under these 
conditions, sustainability of the current account will require higher rates of depreciation 
of the RER than those obtained above. 
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14. However, the country still faces problems in the real sector. There is a need to strengthen 
corporate governance, and there is also a large informal sector in the economy, where 
accounting practices need to be improved. 
15. Foreign-owned firms usually comply strictly with the formal regulatory and tax rules, 
possibly more completely than most domestic firms, in order to avoid any friction with 
the government authorities. They therefore do not enjoy the flexibility of incomplete 
enforcement. 
16. In Turkey foreign-owned firms had long been subject to special authorizations and sec-
toral limitations. In 200 I the Turkish government requested the Foreign Investment 
Advisory Service of the World Bank to conduct a study on the business environment 
affecting foreign direct investment (FDI) firms in Turkey. On the basis of this work, a 
new Law on FDI and important amendments in various laws (Commercial Law and in 
the laws concerning the Employment of Foreigners, the Registry of Title Deeds and 
Public Procurement) were adopted by the parliament in 2003. The new legislation 
removed the screening and pre-approval procedures for FDI projects, redesigned the 
company registration process on an equal footing for domestic and foreign firms, facil-
itated the hiring of foreign employees, included FDI firms in the definition of 'domestic 
tenderer' in public procurement, and authorized foreign persons and companies to 
acquire real estate in Turkey. Thus the new law guarantees national treatment and 
investor rights. According to the law a company can be 100 per cent foreign owned in 
almost all sectors of the economy. Acquisitions of more than 30 hectares by foreigners 
are subject to permission from the Council of Ministers, and establishments in the 
financial, petroleum and mining sectors require special permission, according to appro-
priate laws. 
17. Here we assume that FDI does not take the form of purchases of stocks and that these 
shares can not be liquidated easily in domestic markets. 
18. Williamson (1991) recommends a fixed exchange rate regime for a country that satisfies 
all of the following four conditions: (i) The economy is small and open, so that it satisfies 
the conditions for being absorbed in a larger currency area according to the traditional 
literature on optimum currency areas; (ii) the bulk of its trade is undertaken with the 
trading partner(s) to whose currency (or whose mutually-pegged currencies) it plans to 
peg; (iii) the country pursues a macroeconomic policy that will result in an inflation rate 
consistent with that in the country (or countries) to whose currency (or currencies) it 
plans to peg; and (iv) the country is prepared to adopt institutional arrangements that 
will assure continued credibility of the fixed rate commitment. 
19. Under a crawling peg regime the adjustments are pre-announced, and in high inflation 
countries, the peg can be regularly reset in a series of mini devaluations, as often as 
weekly. 
20. Edwards (1998) maintains that restrictions on capital inflows in Chile have not been 
effective in affecting the RER behaviour. According to Edwards the impact of increas-
ing capital restrictions on RER is limited and short lived. Furthermore, we note that 
accession countries during the pre-accession period have to complete the orderly liber-
alization of capital movements. 
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COMMENTS 
Manfred J.M. Neumann 
Siibidey Togan and Hasan Erse! are to be complimented for providing us 
with a very informative study of Turkey's balance of payments problems 
and the implications of an attempt at reducing the current account deficit 
by devaluing the Turkish lira. The authors show that Turkey's current 
account has deteriorated during recent years while the lira has appreciated 
in real terms. They argue that the present state of the current account is not 
sustainable but needs correction. Consequently, they propose to devalue 
the lira by a sizeable margin and to this end to abandon the current system 
of an independent float in favour of a managed float or alternatively a 
crawling exchange rate band. To be sure, this is a strong policy message that 
requires careful evaluation. 
In this comment I will first use a few economic indicators in order to 
characterize the macroeconomic developments of the 1990s and the 
current state of affairs; next I will discuss the authors' analysis of current 
account sustainability and the issue of the controllability of the real 
exchange rate; and finally I will draw a few policy conclusions. On my 
reading of the data, I am not convinced that a major change of exchange 
rate policy is advisable. 
9C.1 Macroeconomic Assessment 
The main macroeconomic characteristics of the Turkish economy can be 
read from Table 9C. I where the first column summarizes the average per-
formance of the 1990s up to 1998 and the additional columns provide more 
detailed information on the developments since then. To judge from the 
average performance over the past fifteen years, Turkey is a high-inflation, 
twin-deficit country. During the early and mid- I 990s the country suffered 
from high inflation of 78 per cent on average, accompanied by an average 
rate of real growth of about 4.8 per cent. Growth performance during the 
1990s was not particularly impressive for an emerging market economy 
and less than what it used to be during the 1960s and 1970s. As a rule, the 
current account has been in deficit, 0.8 per cent of GNP on average since 
1990, and this has gone along with a rather large budget deficit, 6.6 per cent 
of GNP on average. The deficit was financed by selling debt to the central 
bank, the banks at large and to international investors. Apparently in 
response to a recession in 1999 the budget deficit was doubled in 1999/2000, 
up to 12.7 per cent of GNP, and this unleashed a currency and banking 
crisis in 2000-01 that enforced another recession. As a result, Turkey 
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Table 9C.J Selected indicators of the Turkish economy (%) 
Annual averages 
1990-98 1999-2000 2001 2002-2003 2004 
Inflation 78.4 59.9 54.4 35.1 10.7 
Real GDP growth 4.8 1.2 -7.3 6.9 8.9 
Current account (% GNP) -0.8 -2.8 2.3 -2.1 -5.2 
Appreciation of Turkish lira 
Nominal -56.8 -35.8 -57.3 -21.8 -3.1 
Real 1.2 8.2 -22.2 9.3 5.0 
Budget surplus (% GNP) -6.6 -12.7 -19.6 -11.3 -7.1 
Overnight money 75.9 65.1 92.0 42.8 21.6 
Sources: IFS-statistics, Nominal effective exchange rate: OECD. Real effective exchange 
rate: Chapter 9. 
switched from a crawling peg to float and the lira was devalued by about 
60 per cent. To stem further devaluation the central bank pushed up the 
money market rate from 65 to 92 per cent in nominal terms, from 5 to 38 
per cent in real terms. 
The crisis of 2001 was severe enough to set the stage for a remarkable 
turnaround of policies supported by stand-by arrangements with the 
IMF. The visible results are impressive. Inflation was brought down to 
about 10 per cent in 2004 and this has not gone at the expense of real 
growth. On the contrary real growth has recovered strongly, from 7 per 
cent in 2001 to about 9 per cent in 2004, the highest rate of growth since 
1990. This favourable performance has helped to reduce the budget deficit 
from its record high of 20 per cent of GNP in 2001 to 7 per cent in 2004. 
It seems that Turkey's government is prepared to hold on to the new path 
of fiscal consolidation, as summarized by the primary surplus target of 
6.5 per cent of GNP and that the Central Bank is longing for a further 
decline of the inflation rate. Thus, overall prospects seem bright for the 
Turkish economy even though the labour market appears to be sticky. 
However, as Togan and Ersel rightly note the current account is deterio-
rating. Accompanied by a strong real appreciation of the lira the current 
account deficit widened to 3.4 per cent of GNP in 2003 and even further, 
to 5.2 per cent in 2004. 
9C.2 On the Sustainability of the Current Account Deficit 
The authors believe that Turkey's current account deficit is not sustainable 
and to underpin this belief they compute measures of current account 
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sustainability. The measures are derived from the following balance of 
payments equation, expressed in foreign currency: 
(TB~ - i':'DJ_,) + (FDJ'!: + LlD~) = LlR~, (9C. l) 
where the first bracketed expression on the left-hand side describes the 
current account (non-interest current account minus debt service on the 
stock of external net debt), the second expression specifies the capital 
account (net inflow of foreign direct investment plus change in the stock of 
net debt) and the sum of both equals the transactions change in the central 
bank's net foreign reserves on the right-hand side of the equation. 
Multiplying through by the current exchange rate, dividing by nominal 
GNP, and assuming a clean float, that is, the central bank keeps net reserves 
unchanged, yields after rearranging: 
( 1 + r*) ( 1 + 'n ) 
( (b +fia") + d = I "It d 
ll I l+gl 1-1' (9C.2) 
where tb, f di and d denote the ratios of the non-interest current account 
balance, the net inflow of foreign direct investment and the stock of exter-
nal net debt to GNP; g is the economy's real rate of growth, r* the foreign 
real rate of interest, and TJ the rate of real depreciation of the Turkish lira. 
Solving forward equation (9C.2) yields: 
n 
E1 ~81,;(tb + fdi) 1+; = d1 - E/\ndt+n' 
i= l 
where the discount factor 8 is defined as: 
k 1 +g. 
8 = II I 
1,i . (1 + rf) (1 + TJ·)" 
1= I I I 
(9C.3) 
(9C.4) 
Accordingly, the current state of the balance of payments, as summarized 
by the ratios of the non-interest current account plus the net inflow of 
foreign direct investment, may be called to be sustainable if the discounted 
value of the future net debt ratio, expected for period t + n, does not exceed 
the current net debt ratio: 
(9C.5) 
or, equivalently, 
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E1~'6t,i(tb+fdi) 1+ 1 :=:::: 0 (9C.6) 
i= I 
if the present value of the summed future balance of payments deficits is 
expected to be non-negative. 
To provide content to this analysis the authors assume that (i) the 
Turkish economy will grow at a trend rate of 4 per cent, (ii) it will be able 
to borrow in the international capital market at a permanent real interest 
rate of 8 per cent and (iii) the real effective exchange rate will stay put: 
gt+i =gt= 0.04, r;+; = r;= 0.08, ll1+i = ll1 = 0, 
and (tb + fdi) 1+; = (tb + fdi) 1 
for i = 1, ....... ,10 1, ....... ,20 and I, ....... ,25. 
Using equation (9C.6) these assumptions permit the authors to compute 
for each balance of payments observation the following three forward-
looking sustainability measures S(n) (see Table 9.2): 
S(IO)I = 8.17 X (tb + fdi)t; S(20)1 = 13. 78 X (tb + fdi)i; 
S(25) 1 = 15.88 X (tb + fdi)r 
As the definitions indicate, the sustainability measures are constant multi-
ples of the actual current account indicator, tb + f di. Hence they carry the 
same sign as the indicator but rise in numerical size with the number of 
periods looked ahead because any additional period adds more of the same. 
The question is what can we learn from the measures as regards the 
prospects of the country's international indebtedness? Let us compare for 
illustration the values of the sustainability measure S (10) computed for the 
crisis years 2000 and 2001: 
(tb + fdi) 2000 = -3.0; S(l0)2000 = -24.76; 
(tb + fdi)z001 = 7.2; S(l0)2001 = 58.92. 
The negative S(lO) value computed for 2000 carries the following informa-
tion: if the current account remained for another nine years at its level of 
2000, the present value of Turkey's net indebtedness to foreign countries to 
be expected for the year 2010 is 24.8 per cent of GNP higher than the actual 
indebtedness of 2000. Hence the sustainability condition (9C.5) is violated, 
and the analysis yields the verdict that Turkey's current account of 2000 was 
not sustainable. From 2000 to 2001 the current account indicator changed 
from-3.0 to+ 7.2 per cent of GNP. Accordingly, the sustainability measure 
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S(l 0) switches sign and more than doubles numerically to almost 59 per 
cent. This yields a radically different interpretation: the present value of 
Turkey's net indebtedness to foreign countries to be expected for the year 
2011 is not higher but about 59 per cent of GNP lower than the actual indebt-
edness observed for 2001. It follows that the current account of 2001 was 
sustainable. 
While it is useful to illustrate what will happen if a given state of the 
current account is extrapolated into the future, the example demonstrates 
the narrow limits of the exercise. Within a year an evaluation may quickly 
reverse if the current account turns around. Moreover, given that the sus-
tainability measures are computed as constant multiples of the actual 
current account figures, they do not yield any additional insight into the 
question of whether a particular deficit is a serious one. The very essence 
of sustainability is expectations as regards long-run trends. As long as inter-
national investors have reason to believe that a given current account deficit 
will reverse or at least shrink in the not too distant future, they will hardly 
withdraw. 
9C.3 Enforce Real Devaluation? 
The authors conclude that the lira is overvalued and needs to be devalued 
by a large margin in order to induce a correction of the current account. 
They employ estimated price elasticities of export and import demand to 
compute the likely size of the required exchange rate adjustment. If the esti-
mates of the elasticities are robust, it seems that the required real depreci-
ation is in the range of 40 to 80 per cent. These are large numbers. It goes 
without saying that the required exchange rate adjustment will be much 
smaller, provided the permanent inflow of foreign direct investment can be 
expected to be higher in the future. On the other hand, it needs to be taken 
into account that the authors' focus is on real depreciation. This means that 
the size of nominal depreciation would have to be higher. More import-
antly, a nominal devaluation can serve to achieve a real devaluation in the 
short run but it cannot anchor the real exchange rate at the desired lower 
level because the domestic price level will start rising. Matters are different 
if the nominal exchange rate has been driven up by a bubble but the authors 
do not make that claim and in fact, evidence is lacking. 
Now suppose the authorities drive down the external value of the lira by 
a large margin in one stroke (managed float) or in a pre-announced more 
gradual fashion (crawling exchange rate band). In both cases this can only 
be achieved by permitting the money supply growth to rise. As a result, the 
rate of inflation will turn around and the current perspective of disinflation 
is likely to be destroyed. Moreover, the government's current drive for fiscal 
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consolidation will also be endangered because the devaluation will step up 
the cost of servicing foreign debt. This is not to be taken lightly given that 
the government's foreign indebtedness exceeds 20 per cent of GNP. The 
authors are aware of the potentially huge cost of a large devaluation and 
point to the negative experience of 2001. They nevertheless hold that the 
exchange rate is overvalued by too large a margin to be neglected. 
But note that it is not obvious that the conjecture of overvaluation is 
justified. While it is true that the current account has deteriorated since 
2002, it need not imply that this has happened because Turkish exporters 
have lost competitiveness. In fact, the export of consumption goods, mea-
sured in dollars, has almost doubled in comparison to late 2002. This obser-
vation does not suggest a serious loss of competitiveness. Closer inspection 
of the structure of imports reveals that the deterioration of the trade 
account is due to booming imports, and the dominant factor is not the 
import of consumption goods but of capital and intermediate goods. The 
import of the latter has risen from $45.9 billion in 2002 to $84.8 billion in 
2004. This suggests that Turkey experienced a boom in private fixed capital 
formation. It fits that, according to data published by the State Planning 
Organization, the private investment to GNP ratio has risen since 2001 
from 10.6 to 22.7 per cent in 2004; see Table 9.1. Even though we cannot 
rule out the possibility that some of this investment is inefficient, the strong 
rise in private investment is a positive development. The real capital stock 
of the country is rising and this is likely to generate a permanent increase 
in exports and real growth. Hence, it seems that the recent deterioration of 
Turkey's current account is less dangerous than may appear at first sight. 
The role of private investment may be highlighted by constructing an 
indicator of the current account to GNP ratio that adjusts the actual ratio 
by the contribution of unusually high imports for private investment pur-
poses. The underlying idea is that imports required for building the capital 
stock bear fruit in the future, hence must not be hindered by economic 
policy. Such an indicator can be defined in different ways. For example, one 
might augment the current account balance by adding the difference 
between the actual imports of capital and intermediate goods and their 
normal trend value. The procedure amounts to not counting as part of the 
current account balance the excess ( or shortfall) of such imports relative to 
normal. Alternatively, we might add to the actual current account ratio the 
difference between the actual private investment to GNP ratio and its 
normal trend rate. This is done in Figure 9C.1 where the normal trend rate 
has been approximated by the average private investment ratio of the 
period 1990-2004. 1 The figure is to be interpreted as follows: when the 
adjusted current account ratio, represented by the dashed curve, lies above 
(below) the unadjusted ratio, unusually high (depressed) private investment 
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Figure 9C.1 Turkey's current account ratio(% GDP) 
is a major source of the observed actual stance of the current account. For 
example, in 2000 the private investment ratio was equal to its average value 
of 17.8 per cent of GNP. Therefore, the adjusted current account ratio for 
that year does not differ from the actual ratio and this signals that the high 
current account deficit of 2000 was caused by other factors, namely by an 
exploding budget deficit. In the following year, 2001, the currency crisis 
induced the private investment ratio to fall drastically to a low of 10.6 per 
cent, and this negative development permitted the current account to 
improve. If we inspect 2004, the dashed curve in Figure 9C. l sends the 
information that the actual current account deficit of about 5 per cent has 
been caused to a large extent by the rapid rise of the private investment ratio 
above normal. When private fixed capital formation returns to a more 
normal level, the current account deficit is likely to shrink in response. 
9C.4 Concluding Remark 
Turkey has experienced a remarkably strong recovery from the crisis of 
2000-01. Inflation has come down from double digits and economic 
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growth has doubled. These are the fruits of internal reform, notably from 
a switch to a more disciplined fiscal policy stance that makes it easier for 
the central bank to keep the money supply on a credible track. Looking 
at Turkey from the outside, it appears advisable to continue the path of 
institution-building. A major change in exchange rate policy, away from 
the current float, puts the macroeconomic achievements at risk. Political 
stability, continued fiscal consolidation and independent monetary 
policymaking appear to be key to stronger real growth and stability. At the 
same time they add to the credibility of Turkey's currency, thus reducing 
the danger of another large currency crisis. 
Note 
1. Given that there is no one-to-one relationship between the levels of private investment and 
of imports of capital and intermediate goods, the adjustment factor might be multiplied 
by a weight of smaller unity. 
